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Rethinking ―Murderabilia‖: 
How States Can Restrict Some 
Depictions of Crime as They Restrict 
Child  Pornography 
 
Joseph C. Mauro  
 
Murderabilia refers to items whose commercial value stems 
from their relation to a notorious crime or criminal.  To protect 
victims of crime from psychological harm, most states have passed 
laws restricting the sale of murderabilia.  Many of these laws have 
been challenged on First Amendment grounds, and observers 
consider them to be of questionable constitutionality. 
I propose that the constitutional framework allowing states to 
restrict child pornography can solve this problem.  In New York v. 
Ferber, the Supreme Court held that states may restrict child 
pornography as speech, without regard to its First Amendment 
value, because it is “intrinsically related” to crime in two ways—it 
creates an economic incentive to commit child abuse (to produce 
child pornography) and its circulation harms child victims by 
forcing them to recall their experiences.  The same rationale 
applies to murderabilia, because it creates an economic incentive 
to commit crime and its circulation harms crime victims. 
Nevertheless, considering the range of speech that can be 
considered murderabilia—from bags of dirt to abstract paintings—
laws that restrict murderabilia are more likely to run afoul of the 
First Amendment than child pornography laws.  Therefore, 
 
  Law Clerk, Hon. Sally D. Adkins, Court of Appeals of Maryland.  I would like to 
thank Leonard Niehoff for his guidance and comments.  I would also like to thank the 
IPLJ staff for their hard work editing this article.  Finally, I would like to thank my 
family and friends for their constant support. 
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murderabilia laws must be strictly limited to the most harmful 
crimes, the most vulnerable victims, and the least expressive types 
of murderabilia.  With properly limited laws, states should be free 
to restrict murderabilia as they restrict child pornography under 
Ferber. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A website called ―murderauction.com‖ sells items such as a 
bag of dirt taken from the grave of James Byrd Jr.,
1
 the man who 
was beaten, chained to the back of a truck, and dragged to his 
death over the course of about three miles.
2
  The dirt is available 
for $35.00.
3
  Other websites sell similar items—for example, a 
letter belonging to Coral Eugene Watts, a man who confessed to 
murdering thirteen women.
4
 
Victims and their families sometimes protest these sales.  The 
mother of one of Watts‘ victims said, ―I had reached the point after 
he was convicted and sentenced to life without parole that I 
could . . . remember Elena without seeing his face.  All that has 
come back now.‖5  Sentiments like these help explain why forty 
states have enacted laws restricting the sale of ―murderabilia‖– 
items whose commercial value stems from their relation to a 
notorious crime or criminal.
6
 
 
 1 Renée C. Lee, Byrd Murder Items Won‟t be Sold, Victim‟s Family Happy Web Site 
Called Off Auction, HOUS. CHRON. Apr. 3, 2010, at B2. 
 2 Three Whites Indicted in Dragging Death of Black Man in Texas, CNN.COM (July 6, 
1998, 11:07 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/US/9807/06/dragging.death.02/. 
 3 Lee, supra note 1, at B2. 
 4 Larry Schooler, Texas Law Would Prevent Sale of „Murderabilia‟, NPR.ORG (July 
30, 2007), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=12350079. 
 5  Id. 
 6 See Karen M. Ecker & Margot J. O‘Brien, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti: Can 
New York‟s Son of Sam Law Survive First Amendment Challenge?, 66 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1075, 1075–76 (1991) (footnotes omitted).  While there are a few definitions of this 
relatively new term, I have chosen a broad definition of ―murderabilia‖ because it seems 
more logical to group together all items that are commercially valuable for their 
connection to crime than to attempt to break such items down into sub-categories 
(especially given that the item‘s commercial value is the basis for most laws that attempt 
to regulate such items). See also Suna Chang, Note and Comment, The Prodigal “Son” 
Returns: An Assessment of Current “Son of Sam” Laws and the Reality of the Online 
Murderabilia Marketplace, 31 RUTGERS COMP. & TECH. L.J. 430, 432 (2005) (defining 
murderabilia as ―crime-related memorabilia‖); Ellen Hurley, Note, Overkill: An 
Exaggerated Response to the Sale of Murderabilia, 42 IND. L. REV. 411, 412 (2009) 
(defining murderabilia as ―items associated with notorious criminals that have found a 
market on various Internet sites that cater to serious collectors and to those with a 
macabre fascination for crime-related memorabilia‖); Hugo Kugiya, Crime Does Not 
Pay—Unless you Sell „Murderabilia‟, TODAY PEOPLE, 
http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/40073425 (last updated Nov. 9, 2010) (defining 
murderabilia as ―personal items belonging to convicted serial killers that are sold by 
private dealers‖).  Thus, this paper uses the term ―murderabilia‖ to refer to anything that 
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Although some favor banning murderabilia, the First 
Amendment prohibits a simple ban.
7
  In Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. 
Members of New York State Crime Victims Board, the Supreme 
Court held that states, under the First Amendment, could not 
restrict or tax a convicted criminal‘s speech because of its content, 
even if that content was a perverse interest in murder.
8
  Simon 
struck down a New York statute forbidding convicted criminals 
from profiting from descriptions of their crimes.
9
 
In response to Simon, state legislatures began to address 
murderabilia indirectly.  For example, a handful of states passed 
more narrowly crafted ―anti-profiting‖ laws, which seek to prevent 
criminals from profiting from their crimes (as opposed to profiting 
from publications about their crimes, a distinction that has proved 
difficult to justify).
10
  Although some of these laws have been 
upheld in state courts, others have come under constitutional 
attack.
11
  As a result, murderabilia laws are narrowly enforced, and 
sometimes struck down.
12
 
 
has commercial value because of its connection to a notorious crime or criminal, 
including the personal items that convicts sell from prison, the personal journals of 
convicts like David Berkowitz (the  ―Son of Sam‖), ―snuff films‖ that depict a murder on 
screen, and original newspaper articles detailing a notorious crime. See discussion infra 
Part III; see also David Berkowitz (former “Son of Sam”) Journal, ARISEANDSHINE.ORG, 
http://www.ariseandshine.org/Journal.html (last updated Dec. 29, 2011).  The breadth of 
the definition, while internally consistent, makes it readily apparent that the category 
cannot, consistent with the First Amendment, be banned outright, and needs significant 
doctrinal limits. See discussion infra Part III. 
 7 See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y.S. Crime Victims Bd., 502 
U.S. 105, 123 (1991). 
 8 See id. at 116–18. 
 9 See id. at 109–10, 123.  The statutory scheme placed all revenues in an escrow fund, 
on which victims could make claims. Id. at 109–10. 
 10 See Hurley, supra note 6, at 417–23. 
 11 See id. 
 12 See Paul G. Cassel, Crime Shouldn‟t Pay: A Proposal to Create an Effective and 
Constitutional Federal Anti-Profiting Statute, 19 FED. SENT‘G REP. 119, 120–21 (2006).  
Professor—and Judge—Cassell details how statutes similar to New York‘s ―Son of Sam‖ 
Law have received a ―rocky reception‖ in the courts because they still target expression 
under the First Amendment. Id.  Many of these laws have been challenged and either held 
unconstitutional or otherwise given limiting constructions to avoid running afoul of 
Simon. See Hurley, supra note 6, at 417.  For example, the Department of Justice has 
instructed its lawyers not to use the federal murderabilia law, 18 U.S.C. § 3681, because 
it might be unconstitutional. See id.  Also, the California Supreme Court held its 
murderabilia law to be unconstitutional because it was too similar to the law struck down 
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United States Senator John Cornyn proposed a different 
strategy for combating murderabilia.  He introduced a bill that 
would forbid prisoners from mailing anything with the intent that it 
be put into commerce.
13
  Like anti-profiting laws, Cornyn‘s bill is 
an attempt to combat murderabilia without running afoul of 
Simon‘s prohibition on content-based regulation.  Cornyn‘s bill, 
however, does not address the constitutional concerns raised by 
Simon.  Instead, it simply makes the restriction so broad that it 
appears not to be based on the content of the speech.  Yet the 
Supreme Court has held that speech restrictions based on the 
speaker‘s identity are generally invalid.14  Moreover, Senator 
Cornyn‘s bill would restrict the liberty of prisoners more than is 
necessary to protect crime victims.
15
  Thus, even if the bill is 
passed, it is unlikely to survive Supreme Court review. 
I propose that a different doctrinal framework can solve this 
problem.  The Supreme Court has identified some categories of 
speech for which content-based restrictions can be constitutional.
16
  
 
in Simon. Keenan v. Superior Ct., 40 P.3d 718, 728 (Cal. 2002).  The only difference was 
that the California law applied only to convicted felons and the work had to be more than 
a ―mere passing mention of a felony.‖ Id.  The same was true in Nevada and 
Massachusetts, where murderabilia laws were struck down under Simon. Id. at 421–23.  
The Massachusetts law actually tried to address Simon‘s warning against 
underinclusiveness by covering all contracts related to crime, but it was still held to be an 
impermissible content-based regulation of speech because it required enforcers to 
determine whether contracts for publication were ―substantially related to a crime.‖ Id. at 
421 (citing In re Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 764 N.E.2d 343, 347 (Mass. 
2002)).  Finally, in Maryland and Washington, the highest courts of both states ducked 
the question of constitutionality. Id. at 417–18, 420–21.  These examples help confirm 
the notion that murderabilia laws are generally suspect under the First Amendment.  
There is also a strange holding in the Ninth Circuit, affirming a portion of an injunction 
that forbids Ted Kaczynski, the ―Unabomber,‖ from publishing in his own name; 
anything he publishes must be anonymous. See Samuel P. Nelson & Catherine 
Prendergast, Murderabilia Inc.: Where the First Amendment Fails Academic Freedom, 
108 S. ATLANTIC Q. 667, 682 (2009). 
 13 Hurley, supra note 6, at 411 (citing Stop the Sale of Murderabilia to Protect the 
Dignity of Crime Victims Act of 2007, S. 1528, 110th Cong. (2007)). 
 14 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 883 (2010). 
 15 Thus, I agree with Hurley that Senator Cornyn‘s bill is ―overkill.‖ See generally 
Hurley, supra note 6. 
 16 For a list of such categories, see Susan W. Brenner, Complicit Publication: When 
Should the Dissemination of Ideas and Data be Criminalized?, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 
273 (2003). 
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One such category is child pornography.
17
  Indeed, child 
pornography is unique in that it receives no First Amendment 
protection whatsoever.  Although laws that prohibit child 
pornography are based on the content of the speech, they are 
nonetheless constitutional because child pornography is 
exceptionally harmful.
18
  As the Supreme Court reasoned in New 
York v. Ferber, child pornography merits an exceptional rule 
because it is ―intrinsically related‖ to crime in two ways: (1) it 
encourages others to commit child abuse, and (2) it harms victims 
by forcing them to relive their hurtful experiences.
19
  Cases 
interpreting Ferber refined the rule.
20
 
This article contends that Ferber should apply to murderabilia.  
The Court in United States v. Stevens, while rejecting an attempt to 
apply Ferber outside of child pornography,
21
 suggested that child 
pornography is not the only category of speech to which Ferber 
can apply.
22
  Thus, I argue that Ferber should permit the regulation 
of murderabilia, with significant limitations.  Part I describes child 
pornography laws under Ferber and its progeny.  Part II describes 
how Ferber should apply to murderabilia.  Part III discusses three 
limitations on the application of Ferber to murderabilia—namely, 
which crimes are involved, what form the murderabilia takes, and 
the need to avoid ad hoc balancing. 
 
 17 See id. at 287–335. 
 18 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763–64 (1982). 
 19 See id. at 759 & n.10. 
 20 See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010); Ashcroft v. Free 
Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 254 (2002); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990). 
 21 See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1592 (striking down a law banning depictions of animal 
cruelty). 
 22 See id. at 1586  
Our decisions in Ferber and other cases cannot be taken as 
establishing a freewheeling authority to declare new categories of 
speech outside the scope of the First Amendment.  Maybe there are 
some categories of speech that have been historically unprotected, but 
have not yet been specifically identified or discussed as such in our 
case law.  But if so, there is no evidence that ‗depictions of animal 
cruelty‘ is among them.  We need not foreclose the future recognition 
of such additional categories to reject the Government‘s highly 
manipulable balancing test as a means of identifying them. 
Id. 
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I. BACKGROUND: CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAWS UNDER FERBER 
AND ITS PROGENY 
The First Amendment‘s prohibition on laws ―abridging the 
freedom of speech‖23 requires courts, when faced with statutes that 
restrict certain types of speech, to examine the speech in question 
and determine whether it merits First Amendment protection.
24
  
Often this calculus involves ―balancing‖ or ―weighing‖ the value 
of the speech against the interests advanced by the statute.
25
  
Occasionally, weighing is unnecessary because the category of 
speech, properly cabined, may be banned outright.
26
 
Ferber represents the latter type of case.  It created a 
categorical rule allowing states to ban child pornography.
27
  Ferber 
held that child pornography is peculiar, under the First 
Amendment, in that ―the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly 
outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake, that no process 
of case-by-case adjudication is required.‖28  Thus, although the 
Court recognized the ―inherent dangers of undertaking to regulate 
any form of expression,‖ it upheld New York‘s categorical ban on 
child pornography.
29
 
 
 23 U.S. CONST. Amend. I. 
 24 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763 (1982) (quoting Young v. Am. Mini 
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 60 (1976)).  
 25 See Denver Area Educ. Telcoms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 740–41 (1996) 
(―The essence of [First Amendment] protection is that Congress may not regulate speech 
except in cases of extraordinary need and with the exercise of a degree of care that we 
have not elsewhere required. . . .  Over the years, this Court has restated and refined these 
basic First Amendment principles, adopting them more particularly to the balance of 
competing interests and the special circumstances of each field of application.‖); see also, 
e.g., Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2500 (2011) (employment law 
context); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 754 (2008) (citing  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 
26–27 (1976)) (election law context); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) 
(copyright context); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 707–16 (2000) (protest and privacy 
context); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 371 (1969) (media context).  
 26 Brenner, supra note 16, at 273 (discussing categories of speech such as Child 
pornography, criminal libel, criminal contempt, perjury, conspiracy, treason, espionage, 
harassment, criminal solicitation, fraud, and aiding and abetting). 
 27 See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763–64. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. at 755 (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973)). 
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Ferber distinguished child pornography from obscenity.
30
  
Unlike obscenity, in child pornography cases the ―trier of fact need 
not find that the material appeals to the prurient interest of the 
average person; it is not required that sexual conduct portrayed be 
done so in a patently offensive manner; and the material at issue 
need not be considered as a whole.‖31  Thus, legislatures appear to 
have greater flexibility in crafting child pornography statutes than 
obscenity statutes, because only the latter depend on the definition 
of ―prurient interest‖ and the determination of community 
standards.
32
 
Subsequent cases have clarified Ferber‘s breadth and 
limitations.  Osborne v. Ohio held that states could prohibit the 
private ―possession and viewing of child pornography.‖33  It also 
held that mere nudity does not constitute child pornography; the 
image must be ―lewd.‖34  United States v. Stevens and Ashcroft v. 
Free Speech Coalition placed two limits on the doctrine, holding 
respectively that Ferber does not permit states to ban depictions of 
animal cruelty or ―virtual‖ child pornography, in which no real 
children appear.
35
  These cases also expanded upon the rationales 
in Ferber, explaining in more depth why child pornography may 
be banned without reference to its First Amendment value.
36
  
These rationales, I will argue, allow states to regulate murderabilia 
under Ferber. 
 
 30 See id. at 764. 
 31 Id.  On the other hand, some argue that child pornography should fall under the 
Supreme Court‘s obscenity doctrines. See, e.g., Scot A. Duvall, A Call for Obscenity Law 
Reform, 1 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 75, 96 & n.137 (1992).   
 32 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 
476, 489 (1957). 
 33 Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990). 
 34 Id. at 113–14. 
 35 United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010); Ashcroft v. Free Speech 
Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 250–51 (2002). 
 36 See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586; Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 250–51. 
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II. ARGUMENT: UNDER FERBER, STATES MAY RESTRICT SOME 
TYPES OF MURDERABILIA AS THEY RESTRICT CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
BECAUSE BOTH ARE ―INTRINSICALLY RELATED‖ TO CRIME  
Although the child pornography at issue in Ferber was 
unquestionably speech, it was unprotected by the First 
Amendment, and could be regulated, because it was ―intrinsically 
related‖ to crime.37  Child pornography has been the principal 
example of completely unprotected speech.
38
  The Supreme Court, 
however, in fashioning its jurisprudence regarding child 
pornography, created two factors that indicate which other kinds of 
speech could be regulated under Ferber.  First, how speech is 
made, not what it says, determines its intrinsic relationship to 
crime.
39
  Second, the crime must be sufficiently harmful, which 
can depend on two things: (1) whether the victims are especially 
vulnerable, and (2) whether the harm is grave enough to remove or 
reduce First Amendment protection.
40
  Applying these factors to 
murderabilia, it appears that Ferber left room for states to restrict 
certain depictions of crime just as they restrict child pornography. 
A. How Speech is Made Determines its Intrinsic Relationship to 
Crime 
Speech is ―intrinsically related‖ to crime, for purposes of the 
First Amendment, when the generation of the speech is 
inextricably tied up with crime.
41
  As the Court explained in 
Ashcroft, ―Ferber‟s judgment about child pornography was based 
upon how it was made, not on what it communicated.‖42  In other 
words, because child pornography cannot be generated without 
sexually abusing children, it is ―intrinsically related‖ to that crime. 
Ashcroft struck down a federal statute banning ―virtual‖ child 
pornography.
43
  The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 
 
 37 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982). 
 38 Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 249 (citing Ferber‟s holding that legislatures may ban 
―distribution and sale of child pornography, as well as its production, because these acts 
[are] ‗intrinsically related‘ to the sexual abuse of children . . . .‖). 
 39 Id. at 250–51. 
 40 See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (2010). 
 41 See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 249–51. 
 42 Id. at 250–51. 
 43 See generally id. 
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attempted to ―extend the federal prohibition against child 
pornography to sexually explicit images that appear to depict 
minors but were produced without using any real children.‖44  In 
striking down the statute, Ashcroft observed that Ferber ―relied on 
virtual images . . . as an alternative and permissible means of 
expression.‖45  By permitting virtual images, Ferber was able to 
avoid content discrimination, because in Ferber there was not ―any 
question . . . of censoring a particular literary theme or portrayal of 
sexual activity.  The First Amendment interest [in this case] is 
limited to that of rendering the portrayal somewhat more ‗realistic‘ 
by utilizing or photographing children.‖46  Ashcroft, then, clarified 
that the way in which speech is generated determines whether it is 
―intrinsically related‖ to crime under Ferber.47 
Crimes other than child sexual abuse logically fit into the 
―intrinsically related‖ framework.48  Although Ashcroft may have 
attempted to limit its holding by stating, ―where the speech is 
neither obscene nor the product of sexual abuse, it does not fall 
outside the protection of the First Amendment,‖49  the Court 
cannot have intended to limit its holding so drastically.  Indeed, the 
Court has held that there are numerous categories of speech, 
neither obscene nor the product of sexual abuse, that do not receive 
First Amendment protection in certain circumstances—criminal 
solicitation and conspiracy, to name just two.
50
 
 
 44 Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 239 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251–56 (1998)). 
 45 Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 251 (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763 (1982)). 
 46 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763 (quoting People v. Ferber, 409 N.Y.S.2d 632, 637 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1978)). 
 47 See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 250–51.  It probably goes without saying that virtual 
murders, like virtual child pornography, should remain constitutionally protected.  
Murder and other heinous crimes are omnipresent in popular movies, television shows, 
books, video games, and other forms of expression. See, e.g., CORMAC MCCARTHY, NO 
COUNTRY FOR OLD MEN (2005); SE7EN (New Line Cinema 1995); Dexter (Showtime 
Networks 2006); GRAND THEFT AUTO (BMG Interactive 1997); EMINEM, RECOVERY 
(Aftermath Records 2010).  
 48 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759. 
 49 Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 251 (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764–65). 
 50 See United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 117 (2d Cir. 1999).  And textually, the 
statement in Ashcroft would seem to allow the restriction of speech ―intrinsically related‖ 
to the sexual abuse of adults. 
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Moreover, there is no principled reason why Ferber should be 
limited to child pornography.  Is a victim of sexual abuse harmed 
significantly more than a victim of attempted murder when she 
recalls her terrifying experience?  Is she harmed more than the 
family members of a murder victim?  Does it make sense for the 
First Amendment to leave unprotected a video of a naked child—
harmful as it may be—yet protect a ―snuff film‖ in which an adult 
victim is raped and brutally murdered on tape?
51
  I believe it is 
impossible to objectively weigh the harm suffered by these 
victims, which is why I argue that the First Amendment should not 
arbitrarily draw the line at child pornography while protecting 
snuff films and rape videos—especially considering that they lack 
any ―serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.‖52 
In Ashcroft, the Court suggested that what is unique about child 
pornography is not only that children are sexually abused, but also 
that crime is recorded and victims are created.
53
  Citing Ferber, the 
Court reasoned that ―virtual‖ child pornography is different from 
real child pornography because it ―records no crime and creates no 
victims by its production.‖54  Recording crime and creating 
victims, therefore, are important parts of the intrinsic relationship 
between crime and speech that allows the latter to be regulated.  
 
 51 A bill was introduced in the California legislature in 2000 that would have 
prohibited crush videos of animals and human beings. B. 1853, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999–
2000).  A First Amendment public outcry stemmed from the ACLU based on the human 
part of the bill. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, WOMEN‘S LIVES, MEN‘S LAWS 97 
(2005). 
Instructively, the joint crush/snuff bill had a consent provision only 
for people.  Welcome to humanity: While animals presumably either 
cannot or are presumed not to consent to their videotaped murder, 
human beings could have consented to their own intentional and 
malicious killing if done to make a movie, and the movie would be 
legal.  Even that was not enough to satisfy the avatars of freedom of 
speech.  One wonders anew if human rights are always better than 
animal rights.  
Id.  
 52 United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1591 (quoting Miller v. California, 413 
U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
 53 See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 249 (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759).  
 54 Id. at 250. 
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This rationale can apply to crimes other than child pornography.
55
  
I will now turn to two kinds of intrinsic relationships identified by 
the Court.    
B. Two Ways in which Speech is “Intrinsically Related” to Crime 
Two rationales support extending Ferber‘s framework to some 
non-pornographic speech.  First, Ferber and Ashcroft relied 
heavily on the argument that the circulation of child pornography 
continued to harm the victims.
56
  Second, Ferber reasoned that 
child pornography was ―intrinsically related‖ to crime because its 
consumption created an economic incentive to continue abusing 
children.
57
  As I will attempt to show, these two rationales invite 
the extension of Ferber-type regulation to depictions of other 
crimes.
58
 
1. The Circulation of Speech Continues to Harm Victims 
Child pornography may be restricted because its circulation 
continues to harm the victims of child sexual abuse.  Ashcroft 
 
 55 See id. (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759).  ―Under either rationale, the speech ha[s] . . 
. a proximate link to the crime from which it came.‖ Id.   
 56 See id. at 249; Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759. 
 57 See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761. 
 58 Furthermore, Ashcroft implied that either of these rationales is sufficient, on its own, 
to create the intrinsic relationship necessary to remove First Amendment protection. 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 249–51 (2002) (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 
764–65).  Ferber briefly mentioned a third rationale supporting the outright ban on 
distribution, but it did not elaborate on it, and in any case it would prove too much. See 
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761.  The Court noted that because the state would eliminate all child 
pornography if it could fully enforce its child abuse laws, it had the right to completely 
eliminate child pornography through other means. Id. at 762, 762 n.14 (citing Pittsburgh 
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm‘n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 389 (1973) (―Any 
First Amendment interest which might be served by advertising an ordinary commercial 
proposal and which might arguably outweigh the governmental interest supporting the 
regulation is altogether absent when the commercial activity itself is illegal and the 
restriction on advertising is incidental to a valid limitation on economic activity.‖). 
 While this argument may have prima facie appeal, it proves too much.  If 
legislatures could ban all speech predicated on an illegal act, nobody could learn that a 
crime had been committed, because nobody could talk about it—because there would be 
nothing to talk about ―but for‖ the commission of the crime.  In my opinion, therefore, 
the other two rationales—continued harm to the victim and motivation for the continued 
commission of crime—must support the doctrine alone.  Those crimes can stray into First 
Amendment territory and must be appropriately limited. See discussion infra Part III. 
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reasoned that, ―as a permanent record of a child‘s abuse, the 
continued circulation itself would harm the child who had 
participated.‖59  The same would appear to be true of recordings of 
other crimes that cause similar kinds of harm to victims.  While it 
may be debated which crimes, when recorded and memorialized, 
cause continued harm, certainly some do.  The severe and long-
lasting psychological effect of violent crime on victims is well 
documented.
60
 
Relatives and friends of victims suffer psychological harm as 
well.  For example, a study of family members of murder victims 
found that twenty-five percent developed full-blown posttraumatic 
stress disorder (―PTSD‖), fifty percent exhibited some symptoms 
of PTSD, and twenty-two percent continued suffering some 
symptoms of PTSD a full decade after the murder.
61
  Indeed, ―the 
emotional and psychological distress suffered by the relatives of 
murder victims in many ways resembles that of rape victims, 
combat veterans, and prisoners who have been tortured.‖62  
Additionally, as documented by M. Regina Asaro and Paul T. 
Clements, ―[m]urder has a serious immediate and obvious, as well 
as long-term and subtle impact on the stability, development, 
communication patterns and role performance of surviving 
[family] members.‖63  Accordingly, this paper treats the family 
members of murder victims as victims themselves, subject to the 
risk of continued harm from depictions of their victimization.
64
 
 
 59 Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 249 (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759). 
 60 See, e.g., NAT‘L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (2002), 
http://www.ncvc.org/ncvc/main.aspx?dbName=DocumentViewer&DocumentID=32364; 
NAT‘L ORG. FOR VICTIM ASSISTANCE, Psychological Trauma of Crime Victimization 
(2001), http://www.trynova.org/victiminfo/readings/PsychologicalTraumaofCrime.pdf. 
 61 M. Regina Asaro & Paul T. Clements, Homicide Bereavement: A Family Affair: 
Impact of Murder on the Family, 1 J. FORENSIC NURSING 101, 101–05 (2005).  
 62 Eric Schlosser, A Grief Like No Other, 280 THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY 37, 37–76 
(1997), available at http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/97sep/grief.htm. 
 63 Id. at 51 (citing a study by Dean G. Kilpatrick, the director of the National Crime 
Victims Research and Treatment Center, at the Medical University of South Carolina). 
 64 Who counts as a ―family member‖ is beyond the scope of this paper, but research 
suggests that nearly every murder victim has some persons related closely enough to be 
psychologically harmed.  As noted by Asaro and Clements, when dealing with murder 
victims,  
traditional definitions of family are insufficient. In terms of the 
reactions that may occur in the aftermath of a murder, those in a 
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Osborne reasoned that because the circulation of child 
pornography continues to harm victims, it is important to regulate 
its production, sale, and possession.
65
  The Court explained that 
―the materials produced by child pornographers permanently 
record the victim‘s abuse.  The pornography‘s continued existence 
causes the child victims continuing harm by haunting the children 
in years to come.  The State‘s ban on possession and viewing 
encourages the possessors of these materials to destroy them.‖66  If 
other crimes, when depicted and circulated, cause continuing harm 
to victims, then similar restrictions should apply to depictions of 
those crimes.  Thus, to combat continued harm to victims, states 
should be able to regulate, to some extent, the production, sale, and 
possession of speech that is ―intrinsically related‖ to those 
crimes.
67
 
Indeed, regulating possession could do more to protect victims 
than existing murderabilia laws or anti-profiting laws, because it 
might prevent the government, in some circumstances, from 
circulating harmful speech for its own benefit.  For instance, the 
South Atlantic Quarterly documented a government-sponsored 
exhibit in Washington, D.C., devoted to the murders of Ted 
Kaczynski, the ―Unabomber.‖68  Among the potentially disturbing 
 
relationship with the victim may experience the loss to the degree to 
which they were emotionally attached.  It is therefore important to 
explore how survivors define themselves, in terms of family or 
nonfamily, avoiding judgment about whether they are, in fact, family 
in a legal sense.  This more inclusive view takes into account those 
individuals who were, for example, engaged to the victim, a 
common-law spouse, or a child ‗taken in‘ by a family in light of 
geographic, emotional or physical nonavailability of the 
parents/primary caretakers (Clements & Burgess, 2002).  It also 
includes those who were bound to the victim in a less traditional 
manner, such as same-sex relationships, children who perceived the 
victim to be closer to them emotionally than an actual parent or 
sibling, and grandparents who had custodial care of a child who was 
murdered.   
Asaro & Clements, supra note 61, at 3.  See below, infra Part III.B for a discussion of 
which crimes, in which circumstances, could fall under Ferber‘s rationale. 
 65 See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110–11 (1990). 
 66 Id. at 111.   
 67 See Osborne, 495 U.S. at 110–11. 
 68 See Nelson & Prendergast, supra note 12, at 678–79. 
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parts of the exhibit was ―an interactive display including the names 
and, in many cases, photos of all of Kaczynski‘s victims.  Visitors 
could use a touch screen to select any of the Unabomber‘s victims 
to learn more about the injuries each one sustained.‖69  It is not 
difficult to imagine how such a display could humiliate victims and 
their families by causing them to recall their painful memories, just 
as the mother of Coral Eugene Watts‘ victim was forced to recall 
her daughter‘s death when Watts‘ letter was sold online.70  In these 
circumstances, circulating speech arguably harms the victims just 
as child pornography harms adults who know that thousands of 
people—or even one person—might be observing the sexual abuse 
they suffered as children. 
The Kaczynski display highlights an issue that could arise if 
murderabilia were regulated under Ferber—namely, whether the 
victims, in whose interest the speech is suppressed, should have the 
ability to free it from regulation.  Such a rule might make sense 
from the standpoint of addressing continued harm to victims, but it 
does not make sense in light of Ferber‘s second rationale, that 
possessing and circulating child pornography creates an incentive 
for others to commit crime. 
2. Eliminating the Motive to Commit the Same Crime 
Ashcroft and Ferber reasoned that child pornography may be 
restricted because it creates an incentive for pornographers to 
abuse children.  Ferber found this rationale implicit in the maxim 
of Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.
71: ―It rarely has been 
suggested that the constitutional freedom for speech and press 
extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an integral part 
of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.‖72  The Ferber 
Court reasoned that, as with the speech in Giboney (illegal 
 
 69 Id. at 678. 
 70 See Larry Schooler, supra note 4.  On the other hand, perhaps governmental speech 
and educational displays should not be subject to regulation under Ferber, considering 
that they have different and perhaps more valuable purposes than the artifacts traded on 
murderauction.com.  I will deal with the task of distinguishing between different forms of 
murderabilia later in this paper. 
 71 336 U.S. 490 (1949). 
 72 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 762 & n.14 (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage 
& Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949)). 
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picketing), child pornography is ―an integral part‖ of criminal 
behavior because ―[t]he advertising and selling of child 
pornography provide an economic motive for . . . the production of 
such materials.‖73  Therefore, as with illegal picketing, states can 
restrict images of child pornography without violating the First 
Amendment.  Ashcroft reiterated this rationale, holding that 
―[b]ecause the traffic in child pornography was an economic 
motive for its production, the State had an interest in closing the 
distribution network.‖74 
It is also important to regulate possession in order to remove 
the economic incentive to commit crime.
75
  Osborne upheld Ohio‘s 
restriction on the possession of child pornography, agreeing with 
the State that, ―since the time of our decision in Ferber, much of 
the child pornography market has been driven underground; as a 
result, it is now difficult, if not impossible, to solve the child 
pornography problem by only attacking production and 
distribution.‖76   
Depictions of crime can also create non-economic incentives to 
commit crime.  For example, the mass murderer at Virginia Tech 
stated that he had been inspired by the high school shooters in 
Columbine, Colorado,
77
 whose crimes had been broadcast 
throughout the country.
78
  Thus, publicity can be a powerful 
motivating force to commit crime.  Indeed, right before the 
Virginia Tech shooter committed the murders, he mailed a 
 
 73 Id. at 761–62 (quoting Giboney, 336 U.S. at 498). 
 74 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 249 (2002) (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 
760); see also Ferber, 454 U.S. at 777–78 (Stevens, J., concurring) (―The character of the 
State‘s interest in protecting children from sexual abuse justifies the imposition of 
criminal sanctions against those who profit, directly or indirectly, from the promotion of 
such films.‖). 
 75 See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 249. 
 76 Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109–11 (1990). 
 77 Howard Berkes, Barbara Bradley Hagerty, & Jennifer Ludden, NBC Defends 
Release of Va. Tech Gunman Video, NPR.ORG (Apr. 19, 2007), http://www.npr.org/ 
templates/story/story.php?storyId=9604204. 
 78 See, e.g., DAVE CULLEN, COLUMBINE (2009); ELEPHANT (Fine Line Features 2003); 
BANG BANG YOU‘RE DEAD (Paramount Pictures 2002); BOWLING FOR COLUMBINE 
(United Artists 2002); Law & Order: School Daze (NBC television broadcast May 16, 
2001); Columbine Killers Planned to Kill 500, BBC NEWS (Apr. 27, 1999, 3:00 AM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/329303.stm. 
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―multimedia manifesto‖ to NBC that contained pictures and videos 
of himself and his weapons, and referenced his plans for mass 
murder.
79
  In light of these events, it is not difficult to understand 
why Ferber concluded that depictions of crime can create 
incentives to commit more crime.
80
  The story of the Virginia Tech 
shooter provides a clear example of how depictions of crime can 
inspire copycat criminals seeking fame, a mouthpiece, or both.
81
 
Nevertheless, Justice Alito has suggested that Ferber‘s 
motivational rationale should be interpreted narrowly.  Dissenting 
in Stevens, he contended that the key to Ferber was that the 
―underlying crimes could not be effectively combated without 
targeting the distribution of child pornography,‖ which is a narrow 
description of the motivational rationale—indeed, it does not 
reference motive at all.
82
  Alito‘s version of the test likely would 
not apply much outside of child pornography, because most crimes 
can be ―effectively combated‖ without regulating depictions of 
them (although the Virginia Tech shooting might be an 
exception).
83
  Even so, Alito argues that the ―crush videos‖ 
(stomping on animals) at issue in Stevens had a sufficient 
motivational nexus:  
[T]he criminal acts shown in crush videos cannot be 
prevented without targeting the conduct prohibited 
by § 48—the creation, sale, and possession for sale 
of depictions of animal torture with the intention of 
realizing a commercial profit. . . .  Faced with this 
 
 79 See Berkes, supra note 78. 
 80 See infra Part III.B for a discussion of how one could determine which crimes are 
harmful enough to warrant regulation under Ferber. 
 81 Moreover, the maxim from Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 
(1949), which Ferber used to support its rationale, is by no means limited to purely 
economic motivations—it extends to non-economic motivations as well. See New York 
v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761–62 (1982).  On the other hand, these are exceptional 
examples, and the motivational rationale will of course not be as strong for every crime 
or every type of murderabilia.  Thus, this is an important factor to keep in mind when 
judging which crimes and which kinds of murderabilia could fall under Ferber. 
 82 United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1599 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing 
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759). 
 83 See id. 
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evidence, Congress reasonably chose to target the 
lucrative crush video market.
84
   
Perhaps, then, Alito does not conceive of the motivational rationale 
as narrowly as he claims. 
In any event, the Ferber majority described the motivational 
rationale differently.  Regulating speech need not be an integral 
part of regulating the crime itself; it need only be an integral part 
of regulating material that cannot be produced without committing 
the crime.
85
  Ferber reasoned that ―the distribution network for 
child pornography must be closed if the production of material 
which requires the sexual exploitation of children is to be 
effectively controlled.‖86  Thus, Ferber suggests that closing the 
distribution network is necessary to combat the creation and 
circulation of material related to crime, not the crime itself.
87
   
This statement leaves open the possibility that Ferber applies 
to depictions of other crimes.  While the logic is somewhat circular 
(of course regulating speech is necessary to regulate speech), this 
formulation of the motivational rationale comports with the 
continued harm to victims rationale, and shows that the two 
rationales work in tandem.
88
  Moreover, Ferber clarifies that 
speech cannot be regulated unless it ―requires‖ the commission of 
crime.  This limitation ensures that the rule deals with actual 
crimes, just not as directly as Justice Alito might have wanted. 
The Court has consistently deferred to legislatures to determine 
which kinds of depictions incentivize crime strongly enough to be 
considered ―an integral part‖ of such crime.89  Regarding whether a 
motivational nexus existed, Ferber held that it was sufficient that 
―[t]hirty-five States and Congress have concluded that restraints on 
the distribution of pornographic materials are required in order to 
effectively combat the problem, and there is a body of literature 
 
 84 Id. 
 85 See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761–62 (quoting Giboney, 336 U.S. at 498). 
 86 Id. at 759 (emphasis added). 
 87 See id. at 760. 
 88 See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 249–50 (2002) (citing Ferber, 458 
U.S. at 759–60). 
 89 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761–62. 
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and testimony to support these legislative conclusions.‖90  
Osborne, too, deferred to legislatures in this regard: ―It is also 
surely reasonable for the State to conclude that it will decrease the 
production of child pornography if it penalizes those who possess 
and view the product,‖ in addition to those who produce and 
market it.
91
  If deference to legislatures is the appropriate way for 
courts to determine whether the motivational nexus exists, then the 
fact that approximately forty states and Congress have enacted 
murderabilia laws suggests that Ferber-type restrictions would be 
constitutional in this area. 
III. LIMITING THE EXTENSION OF FERBER 
While it appears that one could constitutionally extend 
Ferber‘s framework to the depiction of other crimes, the 
framework must still be adequately limited, as with any doctrine 
permitting the regulation of speech, so as not to eviscerate the First 
Amendment.  Stevens clarified that any extension of Ferber must 
be properly cabined.  The Court struck down a statute prohibiting 
depictions of animal cruelty because ―‗a substantial number of its 
applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute‘s 
plainly legitimate sweep.‘‖92  Ferber itself, however, held that the 
tailoring need not be 100% precise: 
While the reach of the statute is directed at the hard 
core of child pornography, the Court of Appeals 
was understandably concerned that some protected 
expression, ranging from medical textbooks to 
pictorials in the National Geographic would fall 
prey to the statute.  How often, if ever, it may be 
necessary to employ children to engage in conduct 
clearly within the reach of [the statute] in order to 
produce educational, medical, or artistic works 
 
 90 Id. at 760. 
 91 Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109, 139 (1990).  Also, it should not matter whether 
the material is the original or a reproduction—both can constitute the same motivation for 
continued crime. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765–66 (holding that states can ban 
reproduction of child abuse that occurred and was recorded in a different state). 
 92 United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1587 (2010) (citing Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 740 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
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cannot be known with certainty.  Yet we seriously 
doubt, and it has not been suggested, that these 
arguably impermissible applications of the statute 
amount to more than a tiny fraction of the materials 
within the statute‘s reach.93 
Tracing the line between Stevens and Ferber, a statute is likely 
not overbroad as long as its application to protected materials 
constitutes a ―tiny fraction‖ of its reach. 
Nevertheless, murderabilia is a broader category than child 
pornography, and laws that restrict it must contain more significant 
limits in order to avoid overbreadth.  I believe that three limits, 
stemming from Ferber and its progeny, should be sufficient to this 
end: avoiding ad hoc balancing, cabining murderabilia laws to the 
most heinous crimes, and distinguishing between different types of 
murderabilia. 
A. Avoiding Ad-Hoc Balancing 
No extension of Ferber should create an ad-hoc balancing test.  
Not only did Ferber disclaim any intent to create a balancing test 
(it held that child pornography could be regulated regardless of its 
expressive content), but Justice O‘Connor also explained, in her 
concurring opinion, that a balancing test would be particularly 
inappropriate in this area.
94
  She wrote: ―An exception for 
depictions of serious social value . . . would actually increase 
opportunities for the content-based censorship disfavored by the 
First Amendment.‖95  In other words, a rule that allowed judges to 
decide in each case whether a certain depiction is valuable enough 
to merit protection would invite judges to use their own biases to 
decide which instances of speech to protect.  Justice O‘Connor‘s 
argument is particularly cogent because she is often regarded as 
favoring ad hoc balancing.
96
 
 
 93 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 773. 
 94 See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 774–75 (O‘Connor, J., concurring). 
 95 Id. at 775. 
 96 See generally, e.g., ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22227, PROPERTY 
RIGHTS ―TAKINGS‖: JUSTICE O‘CONNOR‘S OPINIONS (2005) available at 
http://stuff.mit.edu/afs/sipb/contrib/wikileaks-crs/wikileaks-crs-reports/RS22227.pdf. 
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This is not to suggest that the value of speech is entirely 
irrelevant under Ferber.  The potential value of a category of 
speech is relevant to whether it may be restricted consistent with 
the First Amendment.  For example, even if newspapers began to 
print child pornography, they could not be outlawed as such; the 
category of ―newspaper‖ is too broad, and too full of First 
Amendment value, to justify such a ban.  Thus, the value of speech 
is relevant to drawing doctrinal lines around categories of speech, 
some of which may be restricted without reference to the value of 
each individual instance of speech.  Child pornography—along 
with criminal libel, criminal contempt, perjury, conspiracy, 
treason, espionage, harassment, criminal solicitation, fraud, and 
aiding and abetting—is one category of speech that may be 
regulated without reference to how expressive each instance may 
be.
97
  While courts must determine whether each case falls within 
one of the categories, they do not consider the value of the instance 
of speech in making the determination.
98
  Thus, courts need not 
reinvent the doctrine each time it is applied. 
B. To Which Crimes Should Ferber Apply? 
1. The Crimes Must be Precisely Defined in Both the 
Criminal Statute and the Murderabilia Statute 
Although the Court has not specified which types of crimes are 
sufficient for Ferber, it has clarified two principles.  First, the 
conduct must be criminal in the relevant jurisdiction.
99
  Second, the 
murderabilia statute must define its underlying crimes precisely, 
narrowly tailoring the restriction on speech to those crimes for 
which publication causes the most harm.
100
 
Murderabilia laws can apply only to speech that depicts actual 
crimes.  Ferber held that ―the conduct to be prohibited must be 
adequately defined by the applicable state law, as written or 
authoritatively construed.‖101  This limitation is an obvious one, 
 
 97 See generally Brenner, supra note 16. 
 98 See id. 
 99 See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1579 (2010). 
 100 See id. at 1580–81. 
 101 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982). 
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but it is worth mentioning for two reasons.  First, it prevents 
legislatures from attempting to pass off a pure speech restriction as 
a murderabilia law.  Simple disapproval of a speaker‘s message or 
manner of speaking will never justify a murderabilia law under 
Ferber because the actions depicted must in fact be criminal.
102
  
Second, the above language limits the doctrine to depictions of 
―adequately defined‖ crimes.103  Thus, legislatures may not point 
to a vague criminal law to support a murderabilia statute. 
Furthermore, the murderabilia statute itself must be limited to 
crimes for which the two parts of the Ferber doctrine apply—
namely, that the circulation of speech encourages people to commit 
crime or causes additional harm to the victims.
104
  The Court 
elaborated upon this rule in Stevens, which held that Ferber could 
not be extended wholesale to depictions of animal cruelty because, 
while the distribution of animal ―crush videos‖ may motivate 
further acts of animal cruelty, there is no continued harm to the 
animal victim.
105
 
Stevens is an important case for those who seek to extend 
Ferber beyond child pornography.  At several points in the 
opinion, the Court states that the doctrine can indeed be extended 
to depictions of crimes other than child sexual abuse.
106
  For 
example, the opinion states: ―We therefore need not and do not 
decide whether a statute limited to crush videos or other depictions 
of extreme animal cruelty would be constitutional.‖107  If Ferber 
were strictly limited to child pornography, the Court could simply 
have held Ferber may not be extended to other crimes.  The Court 
did not do this, however.
108
  Rather, it explained that the statute 
was overbroad because it banned speech that was clearly protected 
by the First Amendment, in addition to speech that might not have 
been: 
 
 102 See id. at 764–66. 
 103 Id. at 764. 
 104 See, e.g., id. at 761. 
 105 See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1592 (2010). 
 106 See id. at 1586, 1592. 
 107 Id. at 1592. 
 108 See id. at 1586. 
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[T]he Government makes no effort to defend the 
constitutionality of § 48 as applied beyond crush 
videos and depictions of animal fighting.  It argues 
that those particular depictions are intrinsically 
related to criminal conduct . . . and that the ban on 
such speech is narrowly tailored to reinforce 
restrictions on the underlying conduct, prevent 
additional crime arising from the depictions, or 
safeguard public mores.  But the Government 
nowhere attempts to extend these arguments to 
depictions of any other activities—depictions that 
are presumptively protected by the First 
Amendment but that remain subject to the criminal 
sanctions of § 48.  Nor does the Government 
seriously contest that the presumptively 
impermissible applications of § 48 (properly 
construed) far outnumber any permissible ones.
109
 
The fact that the Court mentions ―permissible‖ sanctions against 
depictions of crimes other than child sexual abuse demonstrates 
that Ferber is ripe for extension to other crimes.
110
 
2. The Harm Must Be Sufficiently Grave 
Ferber held that child pornography is exceptionally harmful.  
Most crimes are not harmful enough that depictions of them may 
be regulated without First Amendment protection.
111
  With respect 
to child pornography, however, 
the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly 
outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake, 
that no process of case-by-case adjudication is 
required. . . .  ‗It is irrelevant to the child [who has 
 
 109 Id. at 1592. 
 110 Cf. id. at 1594 (Alito, J., dissenting) (―[T]he Court tacitly assumes for the sake of 
argument that § 48 is valid as applied to these depictions [i.e., crush videos and 
depictions of animal fighting] . . . .‖).  The Court has also stated that pornography that is 
merely degrading to women is not enough to merit the application of the Ferber doctrine, 
which makes sense because the actions depicted are not necessarily criminal. See 
generally Am. Booksellers Ass‘n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff‟d, 
475 U.S. 1001 (1986). 
 111 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982). 
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been abused] whether or not the material . . . has a 
literary, artistic, political or social value.‘112 
Although child pornography is exceptionally harmful, the 
Court never intimated that it was unique in its ability to generate 
speech unprotected by the First Amendment.
113
  As discussed 
above, Stevens appears to have rejected such a notion.
114
  So, 
which crimes should fall under Ferber? 
Methodologically, I believe this question must be answered, to 
the extent possible, by existing Supreme Court precedent.  In this 
regard, I disagree with Joseph Anclien, author of a recent article in 
the Memphis Law Review suggesting that Stevens was wrongly 
decided and that Ferber should have been extended to cover 
depictions of animal cruelty.
115
  Anclien argues that Ferber should 
extend beyond depictions of child abuse, and I agree with this, but 
I disagree with his method for determining how far Ferber should 
extend.  Stevens, rather than being wrongly decided, actually helps 
clarify Ferber‘s reach.116  In striking down the federal statute 
outlawing depictions of animal cruelty, Stevens emphasized that it 
restricted too many kinds of depictions, reaching well beyond the 
―crush videos‖ and ―animal fighting movies‖ that constituted the 
worst kind of harm.
117
   
A more limited statute, however, might have been 
constitutional.  The Court stated that some of the statute‘s 
restrictions may have been ―permissible,‖ referencing the animal 
fighting and ―crush videos‖ emphasized by the government‘s 
attorneys.
118
  Of course, the statute reached beyond such 
depictions, outlawing speech ―presumptively protected by the First 
 
 112 Id. at 761 (quoting Memorandum from Assemblyman Lasher in Support of N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 263.15 (McKinney 2006); id. at 763–64. 
 113 See generally id. 
 114 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1592 (―We therefore need not and do not decide whether a 
statute limited to crush videos or other depictions of extreme animal cruelty would be 
constitutional.‖). 
 115 Joseph J. Anclien, Crush Videos and the Case for Criminalizing Criminal 
Depictions, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 9 (2009).  Anclien clerked for Judge Robert E. Cowen 
on the Third Circuit who dissented in Stevens. Id. at 54 n.a1. 
 116 See generally id. 
 117 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1592. 
118    Id. 
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Amendment.‖119  Yet if crush videos and animal fighting may have 
been harmful enough to merit restriction under Ferber, then other 
types of crimes may be harmful enough. 
I submit, then, that murder is harmful enough.  If the gruesome, 
premeditated torture and killing of an animal might be harmful 
enough to warrant an extension of Ferber, then the gruesome, 
premeditated killing of a person should be as well.
120
  In this way, I 
agree with Anclien that ―snuff films‖ are the most obvious 
extension of Ferber.
121
  Similarly, certain types of violent 
pornography, in which someone is tortured and abused on camera, 
should also fall under Ferber.  In fact, the contrast between an 
animal dying in ―crush videos‖ and someone living in violent 
pornography highlights a significant distinction.
122
  As Ferber 
explained, the continued circulation of such violent pornography is 
certainly more harmful to a victim who is still alive than it is to a 
victim who is dead, notwithstanding the harm to family 
members.
123
 
I disagree with Anclien, however, regarding ―films in which 
perpetrators assault strangers while the act is recorded.‖124  Snuff 
films and violent pornography are definable categories of speech 
that satisfy both of Ferber‘s rationales.  Films recording stranger 
assaults, on the other hand, do not lend themselves to such tight 
definition.  If Ferber created an ad hoc balancing test, then perhaps 
particularly gruesome stranger assaults could be restricted on a 
case-by-case basis.  As discussed above, however, the First 
Amendment in general, and Ferber in particular, do not allow for 
ad hoc balancing—only tightly cabined categories of speech may 
be restricted under Ferber, with courts considering only whether 
an instance of speech falls within a particular category.
125
  As a 
category of speech, stranger assault videos are not harmful enough 
 
119    Id. 
 120 Cf. Brief for Amicus Curiae Northwest Animal Rights Network in Support of 
Petitioner at 5, United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010) (No. 08-769).  
 121 Anclien, supra note 116, at 49. 
 122 See Anclien, supra note 116, at 9.  
 123 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982).  This conclusion is in agreement 
with Anclien, supra note 116, at 52, but under a different analysis. 
 124 Anclien, supra note 116, at 52.  
 125 See supra Part III.A. 
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that ―the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the 
expressive interests, if any, at stake, that no process of case-by-
case adjudication is required.‖126  Accordingly, while stranger 
assaults do generate harm, that harm does not always rise to the 
level of crush videos, snuff films, or violent pornography. 
Thus, at this point, I would allow the regulation of murderabilia 
only when it is related to murder and torture, with the possibility of 
gruesome assault as a properly cabined category.  Such a limitation 
respects the notion that Ferber is indeed exceptional and that the 
First Amendment cannot bow to anything but the most serious 
harm.
127
  I would not suggest that this should forever be the limit, 
however, because cases may arise to challenge the bounds of any 
doctrine.  Thus, perhaps my most important point is 
methodological; that any extension or contraction of Ferber must 
be consistent with precedent and based upon the severity of harm 
that the crime typically causes, not the value, high or low, of the 
instance of speech involved.
128
 
3. Especially Vulnerable Victims 
Ferber also suggests that a crime must create a certain kind of 
victim to be subject to regulation.  In upholding the ban on child 
pornography, the Court compared the statute to ―legislation aimed 
at protecting the physical and emotional well-being of youth even 
when the laws have operated in the sensitive area of 
constitutionally protected rights.‖129  For example, the Court cited 
Prince v. Massachusetts, which held that states can prevent 
children from distributing literature in the streets even though such 
 
 126 See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763–64; Anclien, supra note 115, at 52–53 (explaining that 
stranger assault videos have varying degrees of severity).  Thus, I wonder if Anclien 
would propose ―case-by-case adjudication‖ in this area, notwithstanding his recitation of 
the categorical nature of the Ferber doctrine. See Anclien, supra note 116, at 12 (quoting 
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763–64). 
 127 See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Proactive Legislation and the First Amendment, 99 
MICH. L. REV. 281, 288 (2000) (arguing that laws should not impinge upon the First 
Amendment unless the harms sought to be avoided are ―serious one[s], with some 
gravity‖). 
 128 However, exactly which forms of murderabilia might fall under Ferber must be 
determined with reference to the potential First Amendment value of that category of 
murderabilia. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 129 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 747, 757 (1982). 
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activity falls squarely within the First Amendment.
130
  Ferber also 
cited Ginsburg v. New York, which held that states can protect 
children from non-obscene literature even though accessing such 
literature is a First Amendment right for adults.
131
  These activities 
could be circumscribed because the victims were especially 
vulnerable. 
While Prince and Ginsburg suggest that children are a unique 
class of victim, they need not imply that children are the only 
victims for whom speech ―intrinsically related‖ to crime may be 
restricted.  Again, Stevens refuted such a notion when it implied 
that ―crush videos‖ could be restricted in the interest of victimized 
animals.
132
  In Prince and Ferber, the victims were vulnerable 
because they were children.  But the altercations in the street that 
concerned the Court in Prince are not dangerous for children 
alone.  They are dangerous for any particularly vulnerable group—
for example, the developmentally disabled. 
The same would seem to be true of other kinds of exposure that 
are especially harmful for certain groups—for example, 
murderabilia for crime victims. In murderabilia cases, some 
victims are just as vulnerable as children, or perhaps more so, 
because they are victims of crimes, the depiction of which can 
harm them just as much as altercations in the street or offensive 
non-obscene material can harm a child.  Thus, following Prince 
and Ginsburg, a given article of murderabilia should be suppressed 
under Ferber only when the crime underlying it creates especially 
vulnerable victims. 
This rationale again supports the notion that violent 
pornography should fall under Ferber. It would be difficult to 
argue that the continued circulation of a depiction of someone 
being raped or tortured is less harmful to the victim than the 
continued circulation of the least harmful example of child 
pornography.  This rationale also supports the notion that some 
stranger assault films might fall under Ferber in categories where 
 
 130 Id. at 757 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944)). 
 131 Id. (citing Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637–43 (1968)). 
 132 See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1588 (2010). 
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the victims are especially vulnerable.
133
  For example, people who 
have been victimized by multiple filmed assaults may be more 
psychologically vulnerable to the circulation of the recordings, 
thus justifying some regulation of the films. 
A different calculus emerges with respect to murder victims, 
however, because the primary victims are dead.  Should snuff films 
retain First Amendment protection because their continued 
circulation harms only friends and family of the victim?  One 
could argue that murder victims‘ friends and family are especially 
vulnerable in just the way that Ferber requires.  As described 
above, serious psychological harm results when a family member 
is murdered.
134
  One presumes that such harm would be 
exacerbated if depictions of the murder were widely published—
for example, if the spouse of a murder victim were forced to see 
the slashed body of his or her spouse on billboards or television 
advertisements for a book depicting the killing.
135
  On the other 
hand, perhaps snuff films are so harmful that the motivational 
nexus is strong enough by itself to justify regulation, leaving aside 
the question of continued harm.  Thus, I contend that just as child 
pornography does not magically become legal when its child 
subject dies, a snuff film should not be legal simply because its 
victim is dead. 
4. The Legislature Must Determine that the Speech Should be 
Restricted 
Another prerequisite to upholding the ban on child 
pornography in Ferber was that the legislature had determined that 
it was harmful enough to merit regulation.
136
  In this way, Ferber 
declined to 
second-guess this legislative judgment. . . . Suffice 
it to say that virtually all of the States and the 
United States have passed legislation proscribing 
the production of or otherwise combating ―child 
 
 133 See Anclien, supra note 116, at 51–52. 
134    See supra Part II.B.2. 
 135 See Gigi Stone, „Murderabilia‟ Sales Distress Victims‟ Families, ABC NEWS (Apr. 
15, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/US/story?id=2999398. 
 136 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 (1982). 
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pornography.  The legislative judgment, as well as 
the judgment found in the relevant literature, is that 
the use of children as subjects of pornographic 
materials is harmful to the physiological, emotional, 
and mental health of the child.  That judgment, we 
think, easily passes muster under the First 
Amendment.
137
 
In other words, because state and federal legislatures had 
determined that child pornography was harmful enough to warrant 
an exception to the First Amendment, the Court declined to pass 
judgment on that determination.  Can the same be true of the 
murderabilia laws passed by approximately forty states and the 
federal government?
138
 
While federalism and separation of powers must place some 
limit on this kind of rationale, they also support it when properly 
limited.  On the one hand, ―[i]t is emphatically the province and 
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,‖139 which 
suggests that federal courts may not blindly defer to Congress or 
state legislatures to determine the bounds of First Amendment 
protection.  Furthermore, the scope of countermajoritarian 
constitutional protections like free speech is wisely entrusted to the 
judiciary, not the political branches where majority rules.
140
  On 
the other hand, when it comes to evaluating complex empirical 
questions, such as the difference between certain kinds of 
psychological or physical harm, legislatures may be better 
equipped than courts to investigate and provide answers.  And 
even when the question is not empirical, the Court has stated that 
―evolving standards of decency‖ may be measured at least in part 
by reference to the collective views of state and federal 
legislatures.
141
  Thus, in the same way that Congress and state 
legislatures are well-equipped to empirically investigate harm and 
 
 137 Id.  
 138 See In re Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 764 N.E.2d 343, 347 n.4 (Mass. 
2002); Ecker & O‘Brien, supra note 6, at 1075–76, n.6. 
 139 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
 140 See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62–63 (1936). 
 141 See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 283 (1972) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 
U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). 
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express evolving standards of decency (as well as duty-bound to 
uphold the Constitution), courts are perhaps wise to consider 
legislative judgments regarding which crimes are sufficiently 
harmful to remove First Amendment protection from their 
depictions.  Approximately forty states decided that murderabilia, 
in one form or another, can be sufficiently harmful to overcome 
First Amendment protection.
142
  Which forms, however, remains 
an important question. 
C. Which Forms of Murderabilia Might Fall Under Ferber? 
I have argued that the question of which crimes are covered by 
Ferber must not depend on the value of individual instances of 
speech.  Ad hoc determinations of the value of certain instances of 
speech are impossible to predict, give no notice to litigants or 
speakers, and are subject to the whims of individual judges.  
Moreover, Ferber did not base its rule on the ―low value‖ of the 
speech it examined. 
Nevertheless, it is plausible to assume that Ferber would not 
have been able to disregard the First Amendment value of child 
pornography unless, in general, such value was low.  In other 
words, by holding that child pornography is so harmful that no 
First Amendment interest can overcome it, the Court presumably 
recognized that First Amendment interests would not be affected 
as much as if, for example, newspaper publication were subjected 
to a similar rule. 
It is therefore not the value of any specific instance of speech 
that bears on the Ferber analysis, but the likely potential value of 
certain categories of speech.  In other words, the value-blind 
Ferber analysis cannot sweep away forms of speech that 
commonly carry high-value expression, because such a rule would 
impinge upon the interests that the First Amendment is meant to 
protect.  Thus, I disagree with Anclien that Ferber should not 
―extend to any speech that forms an ‗essential part of any 
exposition of ideas,‘‖143 for it must extend to child pornography in 
 
 142 See In re Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 764 N.E.2d at 347 n.4. 
 143 Anclien, supra note 116, at 53 (emphasis added) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)). 
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which the child recites the Declaration of Independence just as it 
applies to any instance of child pornography.  But Anclien is right 
that the doctrine must not apply to those categories or forms of 
speech that typically have the potential to touch the ―essential . . . 
exposition of ideas.‖144  Only in this way can the doctrine be 
cabined in a way that adequately protects First Amendment values. 
Perhaps it is easy to identify some categories of murderabilia 
that could never fall subject to Ferber because their value is in the 
information they convey.  For example, even if they depict heinous 
crimes, memoirs, works of fiction, biographies, newspapers and 
the like allow the public to learn about important topics in a way 
that would be impossible if such stories were subject to regulation 
under Ferber.  The same would seem to be true of oral recordings 
or taped interviews.  Thus, just as the First Amendment would 
never allow the government to outlaw a documentary about child 
pornography simply because it describes child pornography, it 
would also never allow the government to ban a documentary or 
tell-all confession about a homicide.  Simon, then, as it must, 
remains untouched by my argument.  And this is true even when 
the most notorious murderers are interviewed and their notoriety 
contributes to the popularity of the publication. 
This analysis seems to suggest a sharp distinction between 
visual and written depictions of crime, i.e., that Ferber can extend 
to visual depictions of crime but not written ones.  In general, I 
might agree that this is a good description Ferber‘s bounds, but I 
am not willing to say that all visual depictions may be banned.  For 
example, visual depictions of crimes that are not sufficiently 
harmful to fall under Ferber cannot be banned—such as the videos 
of animal cruelty protected in Stevens.  Also, paintings by famous 
killers have become one of the more popular forms of 
murderabilia.
145
  Although victims object to selling such paintings, 
 
 144 Id. at 20–22 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72). 
 145 See, e.g., David Lohr, Murderabilia: Art or a New Form of Victimization?, 
AOLNEWS.COM (Feb. 13, 2010, 4:33 PM), http://www.aolnews.com/2010/02/ 
13/murderabilia-art-or-a-new-form-of-victimization/ (describing a painting by serial 
killer Danny Rolling on sale for $2000); Sean Richard Sellers 12”x16” Painting Acrylic 
on Canvas, SERIAL KILLERS INK.NET, http://serialkillersink.net/skistore/index.php?_a= 
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the harm to victims seems less direct than where the depiction is a 
photograph or film.  Perhaps here, too, the harm is not weighty 
enough to merit disregarding the expressive value of the category 
of speech (not to mention the therapeutic value for those who may 
be dealing with psychological and emotional issues).
146
  Indeed, it 
would seem that a painting depicting a murderer‘s victim would 
have to be protected under Simon.  Perhaps it is the creative 
element that separates such works from snuff films.  Whatever the 
reason, it must be true that people cannot be silenced simply 
because they have been convicted of a crime, and for this reason 
Senator Cornyn‘s proposed bill, which would prohibit prisoners 
from mailing anything that is for sale, is too broad as well.
147
 
But what is perhaps the most popular form of murderabilia—or 
at least the form that has garnered the most attention of late—
involves no depiction at all.
148
  A number of websites sell or 
auction items that are simply related to a notorious crime or 
criminal, with no expressive modification whatsoever.
149
  In fact, 
these items likely led to the development of the term 
―murderabilia.‖150  Applying the analysis that I have enunciated to 
this type of murderabilia might seem simple—its potential 
expressive value as a category of speech is low, its harm to victims 
is high (at least for significant crimes), and it is ―intrinsically 
 
viewProd&productId=28 (last visited Oct. 17, 2011) (advertising a painting by satanic 
ritualistic Sean Sellers, on sale for $1050). 
 146 See, e.g., Angie Holdsworth, Looming Budget Cuts Threaten Therapy Program for 
Arizona‟s Mentally Ill, ABC15.COM (Dec. 17, 2010), http://www.abc15.com/dpp/news 
/state/Looming-budget-cuts-threaten-therapy-program-for-Arizona‘s-mentally-ill 
(describing art therapy); Stacy Jacobson, Psychiatric Patients Show Off Art Therapy 
Pieces, WBOY.COM, http://66.118.80.206/story.cfm?func=viewstory&storyid=91266 
 (last updated Dec. 17, 2010, 7:16 PM). 
 147 See Hurley, supra note 6, at 416–17 (citing Stop the Sale of Murderabilia to Protect 
the Dignity of Crime Victims Act of 2007, S. 1528, 110th Cong. (2007)).  It seems 
difficult to think of a written depiction of crime that could be banned after Simon, but I do 
not think this needs to be an ironclad rule, either.  If there were to be some form of 
written depiction that as a category of speech had little expressive value, then perhaps it 
could be restricted for the worst crimes as well under the Ferber rationale. 
 148 See, e.g., Schooler, supra note 4. 
 149 See, e.g., id.; MURDERAUCTION.COM, http://www.murderauction.com/index.php (last 
visited Oct. 17, 2011); SERIAL KILLERS INK,NET, http://serialkillersink.net/skistore/ (last 
visited Oct. 17, 2011). 
 150 See supra INTRODUCTION. 
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related‖ to crime; therefore it falls under Ferber and may be 
restricted.  The question, though, is whether its expressive value is 
truly as low as child pornography just because it is an item and not 
a depiction. 
By analogy, cases interpreting the Lanham Act and the right to 
publicity do not afford constitutional protection for works that 
piggyback on another‘s notoriety unless the work uses the 
subject‘s fame in a creative manner.151  For example, simply using 
Rosa Parks‘ name in the title of a song is not protected by the First 
Amendment unless it is a creative use, not one that simply hopes to 
attract attention by mentioning her name.
152
  Perhaps a similar rule 
could apply to murderabilia, i.e., that it is not protected under the 
First Amendment unless it modifies or addresses the criminal‘s 
notoriety in a creative way.  Such a rule seems logical considering 
that a celebrity‘s right to profit from his or her name—the right 
that overcomes the First Amendment under the Lanham Act—
should not be weightier than the right of victims of heinous crimes 
to be free from uncreative products that recall their suffering and 
encourage more crime.  Such a rule would allow governments to 
regulate essentially all ―item murderabilia‖—artifacts with no 
creative element whose value derives solely from their connection 
to crime—since arguably none of it is creative.153 
On the other hand, Ferber allows much stricter regulations than 
the Lanham Act.  Whereas the Lanham Act allows celebrities to 
sue for profits wrongly obtained through the use of their names,
154
 
Ferber and its progeny allow governments to outlaw certain kinds 
of speech and subject possessors and distributors to criminal 
 
 151 Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 451–52 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 152 Id. at 461. 
 153 Another potential justification for restricting ―item murderabilia‖ is that it could 
sometimes be pure commercial speech, which generally may be restricted more easily 
than other kinds of speech, though commercial speech is not as unprotected as child 
pornography. See generally Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm‘n, 447 
U.S. 557 (1980).  In any case, it might be difficult to determine when murderabilia is also 
commercial speech. 
 154 Parks, 329 F.3d at 445. 
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sanctions.
155
  While victims of crime might like this kind of rule, it 
almost certainly goes too far.  Would the victims themselves be 
prohibited from possessing items related to a crime?  Would they 
have to destroy mementos of their lost loved ones?  Would a 
criminal released from jail have to knock down his own house 
because a murder was committed there?  Would the Newseum 
have to close down its exhibit displaying Ted Kaczynski‘s cabin, 
bomb, and handmade gun?
156
  Such examples highlight the fact 
that murderabilia, because it is a broad category, involves more 
instances of First Amendment expression than child pornography, 
which means that any application of Ferber must be strictly 
cabined. 
Regarding ―item murderabilia,‖ therefore, I submit that the 
eight states (plus the federal government) that have passed anti-
profiting laws have found the correct line—namely, that 
unexpressive, uncreative murderabilia cannot be banned 
completely, but legislatures may restrict its sale.
157
  Drawing the 
line at sales for profit would seem to comport with Ferber in that 
selling such items encourages others to commit heinous crimes, 
and continues to harm the victims by bringing up their bad 
memories, but merely possessing or viewing such items is unlikely 
to cause the same kind of harm. 
Therefore, existing anti-profiting laws seem to strike the 
correct balance with respect to ―item murderabilia.‖158  The anti-
 
 155 See generally United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010); Ashcroft v. Free 
Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990); New York v. 
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
 156 See Nelson & Prendergast, supra note 12, at 678–79. 
 157 See Hurley, supra note 6, at 417–23.  Legislatures enacted anti-profiting laws for a 
different reason, i.e., to get around Simon and ensure that their anti-murderabilia laws 
were based on something other than the content of speech. Id.  But this rationale involves 
the inferential leap that ―profiting from crime‖ involves selling something only 
tangentially related to that crime—for example, Richard Ramirez‘s shirt that he wore at 
his trial, which is currently on sale for $1,400.00, arguably has nothing to do with 
Ramirez‘s murders. MURDERAUCTION.COM, supra note 148.  He simply wore it at his 
trial, after the crimes were committed.  And for this reason anti-profiting laws are still 
open to criticism under the First Amendment and Simon, because the anti-profiting 
rationale can seem like a weak subterfuge to get at the speech content of relatedness to 
crime or criminals. But see Hurley, supra note 6, at 417–23. 
 158 Hurley, supra note 6, at 439. 
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profiting rationale does not distinguish those statutes from Simon, 
as some legislators may have hoped, but instead limits the 
application of Ferber in this realm.  In other words, Ferber 
overrides Simon in certain categories of particularly harmful 
speech, such as murderabilia, but in the category of ―item 
murderabilia,‖ Ferber should apply only up to the point where 
anti-profiting laws currently operate, i.e., restricting sales for 
profit.  In this way, Eric Gein, the founder of SerialKillersInk.net, 
may be correct that ―item murderabilia‖ is speech under the First 
Amendment, but he would still have to shut down his 
auctioneering website, at least insofar as it sells the 
murderabilia.
159
  This rule would also square with the notion that 
the academic and historical justifications for websites that auction 
murderabilia were always a thinly veiled excuse for profiteering, 
not unlike the uncreative use of the title ―Rosa Parks‖ in a 
commercially-marketed song. 
CONCLUSION 
I have argued that Ferber should extend to murderabilia 
because its doctrinal language and underlying rationales apply.  As 
with child pornography, murderabilia is ―intrinsically related‖ to 
crime, and allowing it to be restricted in certain circumstances has 
the potential to help victims avoid continued harm and prevent 
more crimes from being committed.  Stevens clarified that Ferber 
can be extended beyond child pornography, and the kinds of 
murderabilia that I have identified in this article seem like a good 
fit. 
But none of this explains why extending Ferber is the best way 
to address this problem.  Forty states and the federal government 
have decided that murderabilia is a problem worth addressing, but 
they have not used Ferber to do it.  Rather, in one way or another, 
they have tried to get around Simon.  In other words, legislatures 
appear to have tried to restrict murderabilia by pretending that they 
were not dealing with speech at all—as if by simply restricting 
―profit‖ (anti-profiting laws) and ―commerce‖ (Senator Cornyn‘s 
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proposed bill), they can take the First Amendment problem off the 
table. 
I think the First Amendment prefers that lawmakers deal 
directly with the constitutional issue.  There is no shortage of 
precedent to support the notion that the most harmful kinds of 
speech can be restricted as speech under properly cabined statutes 
that recite grave harm.  Ferber, in my opinion, is not only the most 
effective way of dealing with the problem of murderabilia, but also 
the most honest.  Ferber and its progeny forthrightly acknowledge 
that some speech is so harmful that it can be restricted, and 
because the cases acknowledge that they are restricting speech, 
they make sure to limit the doctrine to the narrowest categories of 
speech necessary to prevent grave harm.  Virtual child 
pornography and depictions of animal cruelty, no matter how 
distasteful, do not fit. 
But some murderabilia should fit.  As described above, snuff 
films, depictions of rape, and some item murderabilia are so 
harmful to victims, and so lacking in potential value as categories 
of speech, that the First Amendment should not be concerned 
about restricting them any more than it is concerned about 
restricting child pornography.  It is not always the case that where 
doctrinal tests may be extended to new categories, it is wise to do 
so, but this is one of those cases. 
 
